This paper studies mechanism through which intellectual property rights (IPR) protection can in ‡uence the impact of skilled migration on innovation activities in developing countries.
Introduction
International trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) have often been identi…ed as the main determinants of innovation and growth in developing countries (South) (Saggi, 2002; Keller, 2004) .
While the relevance of trade and FDI has been con…rmed with a signi…cant increase in their ratio to world output in the 1990's, high-skill migration from the South to OECD countries has also witnessed a remarkable growth in the same period (Docquier and Rapoport, 2012) . The resulting surge in the outward transfer of the human capital in migrants has created controversial debates about the threats and opportunities that skilled emigration may pose to the South. On the one hand, the traditional literature on migration and brain drain presents mechanisms through which skilled emigration could be detrimental to growth. 1 On the other hand, a growing branch of contributions argues that skilled emigration need not harm the South and may even increase the potential for development.
The so-called brain gain e¤ect derives from an incentive channel that works through the increased expected returns to education brought about by migration prospects (Mountford, 1997; Stark et al. 2007 ; Beine et al., 2001 Beine et al., , 2008 . 2 An additional channel is return migration, which can induce innovation through the knowledge possessed by migrants returning from more advanced economies (Domingues Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay, 2003; Mayr and Peri, 2009; Dustmann et al. 2011 ). Finally, cross-border diaspora networks among skilled emigrants and natives may also promote access to foreign-produced knowledge and foster innovation by encouraging trade, investments, and the recirculation of information back into the sending countries (Agrawal et al., 2011; Kerr, 2008) . Sociological studies, such as Meyer (2001) , suggest that such informal networks are crucial in turning brain drain into a net brain gain. Student/scholarly networks, local associations of skilled expatriates, short-term consultancies by high-skilled expatriates in their country of origins, and other unestablished intellectual/scienti…c diaspora networks are a few examples of such networks (Meyer and Brown, 1999) . 3 This research contributes to the literature by exploring the channel through which the knowledge learned by emigrants after interacting with higher skills in developed countries (North) can ‡ow back to the South. We refer to this channel as an "intellectual diaspora", that is, the remote mobilization of intellectuals and professionals abroad and their connection to scienti…c, technological and cultural programs at home. 4 This can be thought of as a scientist from the South being more productive in the North due to better facilities and more resources, with some of the bene…ts of his innovation ‡owing back to his home country. Diaspora networks make this possible through the cross-border sharing of ideas, for example between Indian computer scientists in Bangalore and their counterparts in Silicon Valley (The Economist, 2009 .
In such a framework, the goal of this paper is to assess the role of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in the South in determining the impact of emigration on innovation activities in the home (sending) country. Motivated by the empirical …ndings in our companion study, Naghavi and Strozzi (2014) , we aim to …nd a mechanism through which an appropriate level of IPR protection could help transform the brain drain caused by skilled emigration into a brain gain. In sum, we argue that although emigration may directly result in a brain drain, it also generates a ‡ow of ideas and inventions back to the sending country, the extent of which depends on the strength of IPR protection.
The role of IPR protection in any study that involves innovation and the developing world is crucial. However, while the trade-o¤s faced by an emerging economy between imitation and the provision of incentives for domestic innovation through IPRs are clear (Maskus, 2000) , the interrelationships between skilled migration and IPR policy in determining innovation remain to be explored. Our work …lls this gap and contributes to the above-mentioned strand of research by capturing the diaspora dimension of migration and revealing how IPR protection in the sending country may in ‡uence the e¤ect of skilled migration on innovation there. 5 On this basis, we shed light on the net impact of emigration on innovation and determine whether a strong IPR regime at home can eventually turn the initial brain drain into a brain gain.
Our theoretical framework is a variant of the Yeaple (2005) and Ohnsorge and Tre ‡er (2007) models of heterogeneous workers, where we introduce an innovation sector, migration, and IPR protection. Emigration reduces e¤ective innovation activities due to the loss of the most skilled (the extensive margin). Migration, however, also opens a diaspora channel through which the knowledge acquired abroad can ‡ow back into the innovation sector in the home economy and enhance the skills of the remaining workers (the intensive margin). To investigate whether the bene…cial e¤ect of diasporas could outweigh the direct negative e¤ect of the out ‡ow of skilled workers, we look at the size of the innovation sector. While a strong level of IPR protection directly reduces e¤ective innovation activities by raising returns to skills and hence engaging also the less skilled mass of workers in the innovation sector, the enlarged sector allows diaspora gains to fall on a larger range of workers actively using their skills in the economy. As a consequence, a strong level of IPR protection in the sending country increases the magnitude of potential bene…ts from diaspora, making it more likely for the gains to outweigh the negative e¤ects of brain drain on innovation, and thus facilitating a potential net brain gain. 6 In the remainder of the paper, we start by presenting some motivating evidence for our analysis in Section 2, present the theory in Sections 3 and 4, and conclude in Section 5.
Some Motivating Evidence
To motivate our theoretical analysis, we here present some evidence about the impact of diaspora knowledge networks on international scienti…c collaborations. The aim is to show whether migration to countries superior in terms of skills results in scienti…c collaboration between innovators in the countries involved and how this so-called international knowledge spillover is a¤ected by home country IPR institutions. To do this, we apply a variant of the strategy proposed by Spilimbergo (2009) to investigate the transfer of norms across countries. On the basis of that intuition, the focus here is to construct a measure of emigration that includes information about "where" the emigrants go. Heterogeneity of the host countries is indeed important as the intensity of knowledge transferred back to the countries of origin could depend on how technologically advanced is the destination country. The underlying assumption is that emigrants may better promote innovation in their home countries if their host countries have a higher potential for innovation. This approach allows us to con…rm that it is the skills learned from abroad by emigrants and transferred back to their home country that increase international scienti…c collaboration, provided that IPR institutions are strong in the country of origin.
While Spilimbergo (2009) argues that foreign-trained individuals promote democracy in their home countries if they study in democratic countries, we here argue that in the presence of strong home country IPRs, emigrants promote innovation in their home countries if their host countries have a high potential for innovation. To capture heterogeneity among destination countries, for each country of origin we construct an emigration measure based on bilateral emigration stocks between that country and its destination countries and a measure of the potential for innovation in each host country. The emigration measure of origin country i is de…ned as
where i is the origin country, j is destination country and t denotes time. m ij is the bilateral emigration stock from country i to country j, M i is total emigration stock from country i, and I j is a measure of innovation in country j. This emigration measure is by construction an index which lies between 0 and 1; the index is 1 if all emigrants go to the countries with very high innovation potential and 0 if all emigrants are in countries with very low potential for innovation.
The innovation indicators we consider are the total number of worldwide patents granted to the residents of each destination country per thousand of population and the R&D expenditure in the destination country. 7 To get an appropriate measure of the globalized nature of knowledge and its worldwide circulation, as proxy of international scienti…c collaboration (i.e. the dependent variable of our empirical exercise) we use the number of inventors from around the world which reside in a country di¤erent from that of the PCT applicant. The measure is taken from Section A. To investigate whether emigration is more likely to result in brain gains under stronger IPR regimes, we explicitly focus on the interrelationships between IPR protection and emigration into countries with superior skills. To this end, we study the determinants of innovation with the help of an empirical speci…cation that introduces the following key variables: the emigration index, the index of IPR protection and the interaction between the two. The sample we use is composed of 35 
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The baseline speci…cation we adopt is the following:
where i denotes the country and t the year. The dependent variable inv t is our measure of international scienti…c collaboration. The variable emigr t 1 represents the lagged emigration index, IP R t 1 is the lagged measure of IPR protection, and emigr t 1 IP R t 1 is the lagged interaction term between the emigration index and IPR protection. The cumulative e¤ect of emigration to more scienti…cally advanced destinations on innovation is then captured by 1 and 3 IP R t 1 and varies with the level of IPR protection. pop t 1 and gdppc t 1 are population and GDP per capita, which are included to account for size e¤ects. Finally, the i 's are time-invariant country-speci…c e¤ects, the t 's are period dummies, and " it is the error term. The results of our empirical exercise are shown in Table 1 below.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Column 1 of the table shows the emigration measure based on total patents in the world owned by residents of the destination country, whereas column 2 uses R&D expenditure in destination to build the same measure. As we can see from the coe¢ cients of the interaction in both cases, the impact of emigration on innovation is positive and highly signi…cant in the presence of strong IPR protection.
Hence, IPRs have a role in promoting the bene…cial e¤ects of the diaspora channel of knowledge. 8 Interestingly, South-North emigration without stringent enforcement of IPRs in the home country instead leads a brain drain. These results suggest that diasporas in innovative destinations play an important role in the transfer of skills and brain gain. More central to our analysis, IPR protection can reduce brain drain and even increase the brain gain impact of emigration in terms of international innovation collaboration in less-developed countries.
3 The Model
The Basic Framework
Suppose there are two regions: a developing economy referred to as the South and an alternative North with better economic opportunities and employment possibilities, where skills and wages are assumed to be higher. Because the focus of our study is the southern market, we concentrate our 8 We have added several other (origin) country-speci…c control variables on top of the country …xed e¤ects, such as patent stock, tertiary education, resident patents, non-resident patents, R&D expenditure and total agriculture share. Most of the chosen variables result not signi…cant or barely signi…cant while the predictions on our main variables of interest remain unchanged. 6 analysis on goods invented, produced and consumed locally in the South. 9 Consumers have the following utility function:
(1)
where individual consumption C i is divided between a continuum of N invented goods subscripted by j 2 (0; N ), and 2 (0; 1) represents the inverse measure of product di¤erentiation.
There are two sectors in the economy: a production and an innovation sector. Labor is the only factor of production and innovation and is mobile between sectors. Workers are spread over a continuum of skills z 2 [0; 1), distributed with density g(z) and cumulative distribution G(z). We normalize the mass of workers to one. De…ne z 1 the skills of a threshold worker indi¤erent between working in the production or the innovation sector and z 2 the threshold above which workers choose to migrate. Throughout the rest of the model, we make the assumption that z 1 < z 2 < 1, in order to allow a positive and …nite level of migration. 10 While production does not require skills, a worker i with skills z i in the innovation sector has productivity h i such that
where z i represents own skill endowment and Z (de…ned below) is the international spillover of knowledge learned by emigrants abroad through what we call the "diaspora" channel. We are interested in observing the initial skill endowment of each individual (their innate ability) used in the innovation sector and how the assumed superior knowledge from the North can ‡ow back to upgrade workers'productivity.
The timing of the model is as follows. Nature reveals the IPR regime, which is assumed to be exogenous to our model. Emigration takes place in period 0, activating the diaspora channel.
Innovation is then carried out in the …rst period, and production occurs in the second.
Emigration in period 0 is modeled as a movement of labor from the South to the North at a cost F , which allows only the highest skilled to move. Potential diaspora is then realized by means of skilled emigrants transferring their newly acquired knowledge back to the South. We de…ne the positive externalities from diaspora networks as 9 Using a reduced form model that abstracts from trade and FDI related issues allows us to single out the impact of South-North migration, but clearly does not provide de…nitive answers to how IPRs and diasporas interact. See Iranzo and Peri (2009) for a study of trade and migration and Davis and Naghavi (2011) for the e¤ects of trade and o¤shoring on innovation within the same occupational choice setting. These papers however do not deal with the issue of IPRs.
1 0 See the Appendix for the feasibility of the assumption.
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where the skills endowment of those who migrate to the North is 
The total number of inventions available for consumption are in turn
To work in the innovation sector, each worker must go through training at a cost e, which is paid in the second period. The wage per unit of skill for the high-skilled in the innovation sector is ! H and is paid in period 2, giving each individual with skills z i a wage equivalent to h i ! H .
In period 2, the production sector absorbs all workers who have not worked in the innovation sector in the …rst period. The production function is CRS in labor and has a productivity equal to one such that there is a one-to-one relationship between output and labor, n j = l j . Individual wage is identical for all workers in this sector and equals ! L .
Patents and Consumption
We use the basic framework presented in Saint-Paul (2003, 2004) as our benchmark, modeling IPR protection as the probability that an innovator can obtain monopoly power over his invention. 11 The probability of being granted a patent is q, which captures the degree of IPR protection. 12 A nonpatented good can be imitated driving its price down to the marginal cost of production normalized = 1= :
Next, consumption is divided between patented and non-patented goods, c P and c N , respectively. Consumers allocate their income y (net of training costs) between the two types of goods by maximizing (1) or equivalently M ax
under the budget constraint
The solution to the above maximization problem is:
captures the love of variety e¤ect as @ =@N > 0 and the disutility caused by monopoly pricing as @ =@q < 0.
Using (1), (8), (10) and (11), aggregate consumption index is therefore
is the aggregate price index.
The value of a patent, which is equal to monopoly pro…ts, is equal to
;
where Y is aggregate income (net of training cost). In the above expression, the …rst term on the right-hand side (RHS) is the mark-up, whereas the second is total demand for the patented good.
Under a competitive labor market, expected pro…t from inventing a new good must equal to its cost in terms of skills such that q = ! H :
Using (12), this gives
Replacing for from (11) and recalling that > 1, stronger patent protection (higher q) increases wages in the innovation sector ! H as
for a given level of aggregate income. More stringent IPR enforcement protects inventors against imitation making it more attractive to work in the innovation sector.
Migration
To determine the migration threshold skill level z 2 , suppose a worker migrates to the North if his gains from doing so, net of migration costs, exceed what he would earn in the innovation sector at home:
where we assume an exogenous wage in the innovation sector of the North higher than that in the South: ! M > ! H . 13 Suppose a positive level of migration is triggered by a reduction in F . We can state Lemma 1 A reduction in the …xed cost of migration encourages emigration of skills to the North @z2 @F > 0 , but opens a channel for potential diaspora gains @ (z) @z2 < 0 . Proof. Follows directly from (4) and (15) .
It follows from Lemmas 1 that a reduction in migration costs F spurs the brain drain syndrome, decreasing the size of the innovation sector by a movement of workers from the upper tail of the distribution of skills out of the country. At the same time migration creates an opportunity for new knowledge to ‡ow into the country through an increased number of skilled migrants abroad (z). 14 
Intellectual Property Rights Protection
To pin down the threshold skill level z 1 above which individuals choose to train and work in the innovation sector, consider a worker with productivity h i , who can either work in the innovation sector and earn ! H h i e, where ! H > 1, or become a production worker with wage ! L = 1.
Choosing the option that generates a higher income, a worker self-selects to work in the innovation sector if
Lemma 2 IPR protection increases returns to skills in the South @! H @q > 0 by blocking imitation, shifting workers from the production to the innovation sector @z1 @! H < 0 . Proof. Follows directly from (14) and (16) .
It follows from Lemmas 2 that better IPR enforcement q attracts production workers to the innovation sector by reducing imitation, thereby increasing the returns to working in that sector (! H ). 15 The impact of IPR enforcement on the southern labor market in the absence of migration is illustrated in Figure 1 .
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Next we look at the e¤ect of IPR protection on the migration decision of innovation workers. A look back at (15) shows that the threshold skill level z 2 increases in wages ! H as @z2 @! H > 0, that is, higher skilled wages in the South discourage emigration to the North. It follows:
Lemma 3 Higher returns to skills obtained through IPR protection retain skilled workers in the home innovation sector @z2 @! H > 0 and reduce the size of diasporas @ (z) @z2 < 0 . Proof. Follows directly from (4), (14) and (15) .
Lemma 3 suggests that IPR protection works as a force against brain drain by preserving skills in the South. An improvement in the IPR protection level q partially prevents migration by recognizing the rights of inventors and discouraging imitation. A change in z 2 also changes the composition of international spillovers that e¤ect workers' productivity. Namely, reduced migration induced by IPRs limits potential gains from diaspora by encouraging more skilled workers to remain in the home economy.
General Equilibrium
The economy is in equilibrium when the allocation of workers across sectors is compatible with the labor and product market clearing conditions. The total number of workers in the production sector in terms of the threshold skill level z 1 is
and total skills in the innovation sector in terms of z 1 and z 2 is expressed by
Market clearing implies that the total output net training cost Y is equal to the total factor income: 16
This equilibrium condition can equivalently be written through the labor market clearing condi-
where the …rst and the second term on the RHS derive from the total consumer demand for the non-patented and patented goods, respectively.
We can close the model by using equations (6), (11), (13) , and (19) to solve for the equilibrium wage in terms of z 1 and z 2 :
An increase in q on the RHS of (21) is always compensated by a fall in z 1 (as @L(z 1 )=@z 1 > 0 in the numerator and @H(z 1 ; z 2 )=@z 1 < 0 in the denominator) and an upward shift in z 2 (as @H(z 1 ; z 2 )=@z 2 > 0) to maintain equilibrium. Using (21) together with (16) , (15) , we obtain the following two-equation system:
Using (21) to rewrite the equilibrium condition (22) and dividing each side of the two equations, it is easy to see that thresholds z 1 and z 2 must move in opposite directions:
The RHS of (23) is clearly decreasing in z 1 and increasing in z 2 as @Z=@z 2 < 0. The LHS is also strictly increasing in z 2 as
where @Z @z2 < 0 and F ! M z 2 < 0 from (15) . Thresholds z 1 and z 2 must therefore move in opposite directions, i.e., @z 2 =@z 1 < 0, to maintain equilibrium. We can state Lemma 4 An exogenous shock to the economy always causes the innovation sector to either expand or contract from both ends @z2 @z1 < 0 . Proof. Derives from (21) and derivations in (22)- (24) .
Lemma 4 states that in general equilibrium, the reallocation of workers in the economy caused by migration or IPR protection either reduces or increases the size of the innovation sector from both sides of the distribution. It will be seen below how this general equilibrium e¤ect reinforces our key results. We can now calculate the dynamics of z 1 and z 2 with respect to changes in the IPR regime, q, and subsequently analyze how skilled emigration could promote innovation in the South.
We then explore the conditions under which the bene…cial e¤ects of cross-border diaspora are likely to outweigh the negative brain drain e¤ect of emigration and transform it into brain gain.
Diasporas and Innovation
This section studies the combined e¤ect of IPRs and migration on innovation in the sending country through the diaspora channel, i.e. the spillover of superior knowledge learned by migrants back to their original country. Such potential gains from skilled migration are denoted by Z in equation
(3) and illustrated in Figure 2 . The aim is to show that although a reduction in migration costs F hurts South's innovations via brain drain by inducing the marginal emigrant to leave (Lemma 1), it also helps the southern inframarginal innovators via diaspora feedbacks. The extent to which such feedbacks create gains for the sending country depends on the size of the innovation sector, itself determined by the level if IPR enforcement.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
To start, observing Lemmas 2-4 reveals that IPR protection increases the size of the innovation sector from both spectrums: Proposition 1 IPRs fosters potential gains from diaspora by expanding the size of the innovation sector from both sides of the spectrum ( dz1 dq < 0, dz2 dq > 0, dz2 dz1 < 0) by attracting less skilled workers into the innovation sector and discouraging skilled workers from migration.
Proof. Follows directly from Lemmas 2-4 with the formal proof in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 states that for any given F that yields a positive level of migration, more stringent IPR protection allows potential gains from diaspora, Z, to fall on a larger range of workers active in the innovation sector. It will be seen below that this e¤ect of IPRs can create net gains from diasporas despite of reducing the number of migrants, as long as the intensity of international knowledge ‡ows is su¢ ciently high (large b). The change in the magnitude of the diaspora mechanism cause by stronger IPRs is depicted in Figure 3 .
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
We can also directly derive the consequences of strengthening IPR enforcement on innovation in the South by calculating the e¤ect of a change in the IPR regime on the number of inventions, N (z).
Corollary 1
The IPR protection increases the number of innovations by driving more workers into the home innovation sector, but also decreases it by limiting migration and hence reducing the amount of diaspora knowledge spillovers. The total e¤ ect is therefore ambiguous dN (z1;z2;q)
It is worth mentioning that the size of innovation sector here is proportional to the number of inventions, N (z), which is itself directly determined by the amount of human capital in the innovation sector, H(z). In an alternative framework, average skills in the innovation sector can also play a role in the productivity of innovation workers, h(z). This concept is for example used in the production function of Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2009, 2010, 2011) to show how the productivity of a worker may depend on the average productivity of his team or how managerial time can be a constraint when a given amount of attention needs to be allocated among workers.
Introducing this feature creates a secondary (direct) negative e¤ect of IPR enforcement on innovation because average skills and hence research productivity is reduced as less talented workers become researchers. Although this e¤ect reinforces the empirical …ndings of Naghavi and Strozzi (2011), we abstract from it in the model for the sake of exposition as it is unnecessary to obtain our results. It will be seen below that IPRs regardless create the conditions for new knowledge from diasporas, Z, to bene…t a larger number of innovation workers in the intensive margin, both the less and the more skilled.
We are now in the position to make some conclusions about how IPR protection in ‡uences the e¤ect of migration on innovation activities in the sending country. Recall from (6) that the number of innovations in the South is proportional to H(z), which according to Equations (2) and (5) depends both on the size of the innovation sector and the potential gains from diaspora. To measure the net e¤ect of migration on innovation in the South, we must weigh the magnitude of the negative brain drain e¤ect against gains brought about by the diaspora channel. To make the point, let's …rst consider a shift from a no-migration scenario to one with a positive level of migration. Brain drain can be summarized as the direct loss of skills embedded in workers who migrate abroad, i.e., the extensive margin. This is, in other words, the amount of skills initially available prior to migration minus the base skills of the remaining workers post-migration:
Next, we rewrite the aggregate supply of skills as
The …rst term on the RHS represents the amount of skills workers in the innovation sector are originally endowed with and the second term the aggregate diaspora e¤ect on the same workers still residing in the South, i.e., the intensive margin. 17 The second term on the RHS of (26) denotes the virtual return of upgraded skills through diasporas and can be rewritten to de…ne brain gain as
where [G(z 2 ) G(z 1 )] represents the size of the innovation sector, which is then multiplied by the diaspora term b (z) to account for the total e¤ect of the latter on innovation in the home economy.
Recall that an improvement in the IPR regime increases returns to skills (working in the innovation sector) by increasing wages ! H . This results in an expansion of the innovation sector by reducing z 1 and increasing z 2 . The RHS of Equation (27) reveals that protecting IPRs increases the number of workers in the innovation sector who can bene…t from diaspora by enlarging [G(z 2 ) G(z 1 )].
However it also reduces the size of diasporas (number of migrants) and the amount of potential knowledge they can send back.
To determine whether the brain gain e¤ects caused by a diaspora channel could dominate the ‡ight of skills caused by brain drain, we must calculate the net e¤ect of migration on total human capital in the sending country and test whether
As seen above, the term b[G(z 2 ) G(z 1 )] can take a value greater or less than one. Brain gains through diaspora dominate when > 1, which is more likely for high levels of IPR protection because @z1 @q < 0 ) G 0 (z 1 ) > 0 ) @ @z1 < 0 and @z2 @q > 0 ) G 0 (z 2 ) > 0 ) @ @z2 > 0. As a result, IPRs makes it more likely for skilled migration to generate brain gains by increasing the size of the innovation sector. Also the intensity of international spillovers (b) must be large enough to compensate for the negative diaspora e¤ect of IPRs through reduced stock of knowledge that can be sent back ( (z)). Proof. Derives from Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 together with (28) .
Looking at the problem from a broader perspective, we can also calculate the e¤ect of an exogenous reduction in migration costs F on the number of innovations in the South and how the sign of the change depends on the IPR regime. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we have explored the link between cross-border diaspora networks and innovation capacity in migrants'countries of origin. The perspective we adopt is that of a developing country.
We argue that although skilled emigration out of a developing country may directly result in the well-known concept of brain drain, it can also cause an indirect brain gain e¤ect, the extent of which depends on the level of intellectual property rights protection in the country of origin. While the literature on brain gain and development highlights that the brain gain channel is realized through an increase in the incentives for human capital formation in the sending countries, in our framework the brain gain channel is realized through an increase in the size of the innovation sector. Both interpretations, however, lead to the same conclusion: under certain conditions, skilled emigration could be bene…cial for growth in the sending countries.
We investigate under what circumstances skilled emigration may be bene…cial for development.
We show that this occurs in the presence of a strong IPR regime, which may turn a brain drain into a brain gain. IPR protection in ‡uences a country's potential for innovation by changing the size of the innovation sector. This could increase the absorptive capacity of the emigrants'country of origin, thus leading to more bene…cial e¤ects from cross-border diaspora networks.
The mechanism at work is as follows. Emigration has two e¤ects. On the one hand, it decreases the amount of skills in the innovation sector by losing the most skilled through a lower z 2 (the extensive margin). On the other hand, it can increase the skills of the remaining workers in the innovation sector because of the diaspora channel (the intensive margin). This latter e¤ect occurs through (z), which enhances the skills of all remaining individuals in the innovation sector as long as b > 0. The IPR regime in turn in ‡uences innovation by changing the size of the innovation sector.
An increase in IPR protection enhances the attractiveness of working in the innovation sector, thus increasing its size from both ends of the spectrum: this causes a ‡ow of low-skilled workers from the production to the innovation sector (i.e., z 1 falls) and reduces emigration (i.e., z 2 rises). Although
IPRs reduce the size of the diaspora by limiting migration, the potential for absorption of the newly acquired skills from the North is higher because the diaspora e¤ect in ‡uences a larger range of workers.
Our theory draws upon the realistic assumption that emigration may give origin to cross-border diaspora networks between skilled emigrants and natives. It turns out that in the presence of a strong IPR regime the gains in human capital deriving from the diaspora channel of knowledge are more likely to outweigh the direct drain of skills caused by emigration. As a consequence, when patents are su¢ ciently protected, informal networks of emigrants and people remaining at home are crucial in turning a brain drain into a brain gain. The simple setting introduced is a …rst step to highlight the joint role of institutions and migration in promoting growth and aims to encourage further research on the issue. It can be extended to incorporate a wider range of topics into the framework such as trade, FDI, and imitation (versus innovation) in developing countries.
We would like to establish whether
Considering ! H as a function of z 1 , z 2 , and q, we have the two conditions given by two functions i (z 1 ; z 2 ; q) = 0 for i = 1; 2: 8 > < > :
Subsequently, we calculate the total di¤erentials d 1 and d 2 and equate them:
Then, we consider the plane (z 1 ; q) to evaluate the slope of the function z 1 (q), so we impose dz 2 = 0, dZ = 0, and after calculating the …rst-order partial derivatives we obtain:
! H ( ) + (z 1 + Z) @! H @z 1 dz 1 (z 1 + Z) @! H @q dq = (z 2 + Z) @! H @z 1 dz 1 + (z 2 + Z) @! H @q dq:
Subsequently, we collect terms and identify the ratio of the di¤erentials:
From the investigation of (A1) we can deduce that dz 1 dq < 0 as @! H @z 1 > 0 and @! H @q > 0:
We can repeat the same procedure by setting dz 1 = 0 and dZ = 0 in the relation d 1 = d 2 to establish a relationship between the di¤erentials dz 2 and dq:
(z 1 + Z) @! H @z 2 dz 2 ! H @Z @z 2 dz 2 (z 1 + Z) @! H @q dq = ! H ( ) ! M + (z 2 + Z) @! H @z 2 + ! H @Z @z 2 dz 2 dz 2 + (z 2 + Z) @! H @q dq:
The slope will amount to the following:
(A3) has a form that is analogous to (A1), so we can carry out a similar investigation:
dz 2 dq > 0 as ! H ! M < 0, @! H @z 2 < 0, @Z @z 2 < 0, and @! H @q > 0:
We have therefore proved that dz 1 dq < 0; dz 2 dq > 0:
That is, stronger IPR protection expands the size of the innovation sector from both sides of the spectrum of skills by decreasing z 1 and increasing z 2 .
Finally, to account for the general equilibrium e¤ect, we must also derive the sign of dz 2 dz 1 . Dividing (A3) by (A1) we obtain dz 2 =dq dz 1 =dq = dz 2 dz 1 = ! H ( ) + (z 1 + z 2 + 2Z) @! H @z 1 ! H ( ) ! M + (z 2 + z 1 + 2Z) @! H @z 2 + 2! H @Z @z 2 (A4)
Using the same argument as that for (A1) and (A3), we can deduce from (A4) that
This is because, given (A2), the numerator of (A4) is positive while the denominator is negative.
We have therefore proved that stronger IPR protection expands the size of the innovation sector from both sides of the spectrum of skills by decreasing z 1 and increasing z 2 . Furthermore, thresholds z 1 and z 2 always move in opposite directions. Table 1 The role of diaspora networks and IPR protection in international scientific collaboration (1) 
IPR -1 -0.345** -0.535** (0.160) (0.254) Population Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at country level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable is the number of inventors from around the world which reside in a country different from that of the PCT applicant. IPR is the index of intellectual property rights protection. Emigr. index (patents) is the emigration index based on the number of worldwide patents granted to the residents of each destination country, while Emigr. index (R&D) is the emigration index based on R&D expenditure in destination. Emigr. index (patents) -1 x IPR -1 and Emigr. index (R&D) -1 x IPR -1 are the interaction terms. Inventors, patents, emigration stock, population and GDP per capita are in logarithms. All estimations are in fixed effects. 
